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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) will emerge as a cornerstone in automotive software engineering. How-
ever, developing systems with DNNs introduces novel challenges for safety assessments. This paper reviews
the state-of-the-art in verification and validation of safety-critical systems that rely on machine learning.
Furthermore, we report from a workshop series on DNNs for perception with automotive experts in Sweden,
confirming that ISO 26262 largely contravenes the nature of DNNs. We recommend aerospace-to-automotive
knowledge transfer and systems-based safety approaches, e.g., safety cage architectures and simulated system
test cases.
Keywords: deep learning, safety-critical systems, machine learning, verification and validation,
ISO 26262
1. Introduction
As an enabling technology for autonomous driving,
Deep learning Neural Networks (DNN) will emerge
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as a cornerstone in automotive software engineer-
ing. Automotive software solutions using DNNs is
a hot topic, with new advances being reported al-
most weekly. Also in the academic context, several
research communities study DNNs in the automo-
tive domain from various perspectives, e.g., applied
Machine Learning (ML)75, software engineering28,
safety engineering78, and Verification & Validation
(V&V)50.
DNNs are used to enable vehicle environmental
perception, i.e., awareness of elements in the sur-
rounding traffic. Successful perception is a prerequi-
site for autonomous features such as lane departure
detection, path/trajectory planning, vehicle tracking,
behavior analysis, and scene understanding111 – and
a prerequisite to reach levels 3-5 as defined by SAE
International’s levels of driving automation. A wide
range of sensors have been used to collect input data
from the environment, but the most common ap-
proach is to rely on front-facing cameras34. In recent
years, DNNs have demonstrated their usefulness in
classifying such camera data, which in turn has en-
abled both perception and subsequent breakthroughs
toward autonomous driving54.
From an ISO 26262 safety assurance perspec-
tive, however, developing systems based on DNNs
constitutes a major paradigm shift compared to con-
ventional systems∗28. Andrej Karpathy, Director of
AI at Tesla, boldly refers to the new era as “Soft-
ware 2.0”†. No longer do human engineers explicitly
describe all system behavior in source code, instead
DNNs are trained using enormous amounts of his-
torical data.
DNNs have been reported to deliver superhuman
classification accuracy for specific tasks35, but in-
evitably they will occasionally fail to generalize93.
Unfortunately, from a safety perspective, analyz-
ing when this might happen is currently not possi-
ble due to the black-box nature of DNNs. A state-
of-the-art DNN might be composed of hundreds of
millions of parameter weights, thus the methods
for V&V of DNN components must be different
compared to approaches for human readable source
code. Techniques enforced by ISO 26262 such as
source code reviews and exhaustive coverage testing
are not applicable78.
The contribution of this review paper is twofold.
First, we describe the state-of-the-art in V&V of
safety-critical systems that rely on ML. We survey
academic literature, partly through a reproducible
snowballing review 103, i.e., establishing a body of
literature by tracing referencing and referenced pa-
pers. Second, we elicit the most pressing challenges
when engineering safety-critical DNN components
in the automotive domain. We report from work-
shops with automotive experts, and we validate find-
ings from the literature review through an industrial
survey. The research has been conducted as part of
SMILE‡, a joint research project between RISE AB,
Volvo AB, Volvo Cars, QRTech AB, and Semcon
AB.
The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows: Section 2 presents safety engineering con-
cepts within the automotive domain and introduces
the fundamentals of DNNs. Section 3 describes the
proposed research method, including four sources of
empirical evidence, and Section 4 reports our find-
ings. Section 5 presents a synthesis targeting our
two objectives, and discusses implications for re-
search and practice. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper and outlines the most promising directions for
future work. Throughout the paper, we use the nota-
tion [PX] to explicitly indicate publications that are
part of the snowballing literature study.
2. Background
This section first presents development of safety-
critical software according to the ISO 26262
standard44. Second, we introduce fundamentals of
DNNs, required to understand how it could allow
vehicular perception. In the remainder of this paper,
we adhere to the following three definitions related
to safety-critical systems:
• Safety is “freedom from unacceptable risk of
physical injury or of damage to the health of
∗ by conventional systems we mean any system that does not have the ability to learn or improve from experience
† https://medium.com/@karpathy/software-2-0-a64152b37c35
‡ The SMILE project: Safety analysis and verification/validation of MachIne LEarning based systems
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people”43
• Robustness is “the degree to which a component
can function correctly in the presence of invalid
inputs or stressful environmental conditions”42
• Reliability is “the probability that a component
performs its required functions for a desired pe-
riod of time without failure in specified environ-
ments with a desired confidence”11
2.1. Safety Engineering in the Automotive
Domain: ISO 26262
Safety is not a property that can be added at the end
of the design. Instead, it must be an integral part of
the entire engineering process. To successfully engi-
neer a safe system, a systematic safety analysis and
a methodological approach to managing risks are
required8. Safety analysis comprises identification
of hazards, development of approaches to eliminate
hazards or mitigate their consequences, and verifica-
tion that the approaches are in place in the system.
Risk assessment is used to determine how safe a sys-
tem is, and to analyze alternatives to lower the risks
in the system.
Safety has always been an important concern
in engineering, and best practices have often been
collected in governmental or industry safety stan-
dards. Common standards provide a common vo-
cabulary as well as a way for both internal and ex-
ternal safety assessment, i.e., work tasks for both
engineers working in the development organiza-
tion and for independent safety assessors from cer-
tification bodies. For software-intensive systems,
the generic meta-standard IEC 6150843 introduces
the fundamentals of functional safety for Elec-
trical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE)
Safety-related Systems, i.e., hazards caused by
malfunctioning E/E/PE systems rather than non-
functional considerations such as fire, radiation, and
corrosion. Several different domains have their own
adaptations of IEC 61508.
ISO 2626244 is the automotive derivative of
IEC 61508, organized into 10 parts, constituting a
comprehensive safety standard covering all aspects
of automotive development, production, and main-
tenance of safety-related systems. V&V are core ac-
tivities in safety-critical development and thus dis-
cussed in detail in ISO 26262, especially in Part 4:
Product development at the system level and Part
6: Product development at the software level. The
scope of the current ISO 26262 standard is series
production passenger cars with a max gross weight
of 3,500 kg. However, the second edition of the
standard, expected in the beginning of 2019, will
broaden the scope to cover also trucks, buses, and
motorcycles.
The automotive safety lifecycle (ASL) is one key
component of ISO 2626266, defining fundamental
concepts such as safety manager, safety plan, and
confirmation measures including safety review and
audit. The ASL describes six phases: manage-
ment, development, production, operation, service,
and decommission. Assuming that a safety-critical
DNN will be considered a software unit, especially
the development phase on the software level (Part
6) mandates practices that will require special treat-
ment. Examples include verification of software
implementation using inspections (Part 6:8.4.5) and
conventional structural code coverage metrics (Part
6:9.4.5). It is evident that certain ISO 26262 pro-
cess requirements cannot apply to ML-based soft-
ware units, in line with how model-based develop-
ment is currently partially excluded.
Another key component of ISO 26262 is the au-
tomotive safety integrity level (ASIL). In the begin-
ning of the ASL development phase, a safety anal-
ysis of all critical functions of the system is con-
ducted, with a focus on hazards. Then a risk anal-
ysis combining 1) the probability of exposure, 2)
the driver’s possible controllability, and 3) the pos-
sible severity of the outcome, results in an ASIL
between A and D. ISO 26262 enforces develop-
ment and verification practices corresponding to the
ASIL, with the most rigorous practices required for
ASIL D. Functions that are not safety-critical, i.e.,
below ASIL A, are referred to as ‘QM’ as no more
than the normal quality management process is en-
forced.
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2.2. Deep Learning for Perception: Approaches
and Challenges
While there currently is a deep learning hype, there
is no doubt that the technique has produced ground-
breaking results in various fields – by clever utiliza-
tion of the increased processing power in the last
decade, nowadays available in inexpensive GPUs,
combined with the ever-increasing availability of
data.
Deep learning is enabled by DNNs, which are
a kind of Artificial Neural Networks (ANN). To
some extent inspired by biological connectomes,
i.e., mappings of neural connections such as in the
human brain, ANNs composed of connected layers
of neurons are designed to learn to perform classi-
fication tasks. While ANNs have been studied for
decades, significant breakthroughs came when the
increased processing power allowed adding more
and more layers of neurons – which also increased
the number of connections between neurons by or-
ders of magnitude. The exact number of layers,
however, needed for a DNN to qualify as deep is
debatable.
A major advantage of DNNs is that the classifier
is less dependent on feature engineering, i.e., using
domain knowledge to (perhaps manually) identify
properties in data for ML to learn from – this is of-
ten difficult. Examples of operations used to extract
features in computer vision include: color analysis,
edge extraction, shape matching, and texture analy-
sis. What DNNs instead introduced was an ML so-
lution that learned those features directly from input
data, greatly decreasing the need for human feature
engineering. DNNs have been particularly success-
ful in speech recognition, computer vision, and text
processing – areas in which ML results were lim-
ited by the tedious work required to extract effective
features.
In computer vision, essential for vehicular per-
ception, the state-of-the-art is represented by a spe-
cial class of DNNs known as Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN) 36,95,88,27. Since 2010, several ap-
proaches based on CNNs have been proposed – and
in only five years of incremental research the best
CNNs matched the image classification accuracy
of humans. CNN-based image recognition is now
reaching the masses, as companies like Nvidia, In-
tel, etc. are now commercializing specialized hard-
ware with automotive applications in mind such as
the Drive PX series. Success stories in the auto-
motive domain include lane keeping applications for
self-driving cars14,79.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) is an-
other approach in deep learning research that is cur-
rently receiving considerable interest30,74. In con-
trast to discriminative networks (what has been dis-
cussed so far) that learn boundaries between classes
in the data for the purpose of classification, a gen-
erative network can instead be used to learn the
probability of features given a specific class. Thus,
a GAN could be used to generate samples from a
learned network – which could possibly be used to
expand available training data with additional syn-
thetic data. GANs can also be used to generate ad-
versarial examples, i.e., inputs to ML classifiers in-
tentionally created to cause misclassification.
Finally, successful applications of DNNs rely on
the availability of large labeled datasets from which
to learn features. In many cases, such labels are
limited or does not exist at all. To maximize the
utility of the labeled data, truly hard currency for
anyone engineering ML-based systems, techniques
such as transfer learning are used to adapt knowl-
edge learned from one dataset to another domain29.
3. Research method
The overarching goal of the SMILE project is to
develop approaches to V&V of ML-based systems,
more specifically automotive applications relying on
DNNs. Our current paper is guided by two research
questions:
RQ1 What is the state-of-the-art in V&V of ML-
based safety-critical systems?
RQ2 What are the main challenges when engineer-
ing safety-critical systems with DNN components
in the automotive domain?
Fig. 1 shows an overview of the research, di-
vided into three sequential parts (P1-P3). Each part
concluded with a Milestone (I–III). In Fig. 1, tasks
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driven by academia (or research institutes) are pre-
sented in the light gray area – primarily addressing
RQ1. Tasks in the darker gray area above, are pri-
marily geared toward collecting data in the light of
RQ2, and mostly involve industry practitioners. The
darkest gray areas denote involvement of practition-
ers that were active in safety-critical development
but not part of the SMILE project.
Fig. 1. Overview of the SMILE project and its three mile-
stones. The figure illustrates the joint industry/academia na-
ture of SMILE, indicated by light gray background for tasks
driven by academia and darker gray for tasks conducted by
practitioners.
In the first part of the project (P1 in Fig. 1),
we initiated a systematic snowballing review of aca-
demic literature to map the state-of-the-art. In par-
allel, we organized a workshop series with domain
experts from industry with monthly meetings to also
assess the state-of-practice in the Swedish automo-
tive industry. The literature review was seeded by
discussions from the project definition phase (a).
Later, we shared intermediate findings from the lit-
erature review at workshop #4 (b) and final results
were brought up to discussion at workshop #6 (c).
The first part of the project concluded with Mile-
stone I: a collection of industry perspectives.
The second part of the SMILE project (P2 in
Fig. 1) involved an analysis of the identified liter-
ature (d). We extracted challenges and solution pro-
posals from the literature, and categorized them ac-
cording to a structure that inductively emerged dur-
ing the process (see Section 3.1). Subsequently, we
created a questionnaire-based survey to validate our
findings and to receive input from industry prac-
titioners beyond SMILE (e). The second phase
concluded with analyzing the survey data at Mile-
stone II.
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In the third part of the project (P3 in Fig. 1), we
collected all results (f), and performed a synthesis
(g). Finally, writing this article concludes the re-
search at Milestone III.
Fig. 2 shows an overview of the SMILE project
from an evidence perspective. The collection of
empirical evidence was divided into two indepen-
dent tracks resulting in four sets of evidence, re-
flecting the nature of the joint academia/industry
project. Furthermore, the split enabled us to bal-
ance the trade-off between rigor and relevance that
plagues applied research projects45.
As shown in the upper part of Figure 2, the
SMILE consortium performed (non-replicable, from
now on: “ad hoc”) searching for related work. An
early set of papers was used to seed the systematic
search described in the next paragraph. The findings
in the body of related work (cf. A in Fig. 2) were
discussed at the workshops. The workshops served
dual purposes, they collected empirical evidence of
priorities and current needs in the Swedish automo-
tive industry (cf. B in Fig. 2), and they validated
the relevance of the research identified through the
ad hoc literature search. The upper part focused on
maximizing industrial relevance, at the expense of
rigor, i.e., we are certain that the findings are rel-
evant to the Swedish automotive industry, but the
research was conducted in an ad hoc fashion with
limited traceability and replicability. The right part
of Figure 2 complements the practice-oriented re-
search of the SMILE project by a systematic liter-
ature review, adhering to an established process103.
The identified papers (cf. C in Fig. 2)) were sys-
tematized and the result was validated through a
questionnaire-based survey. The survey also acted
as a means to collect additional primary evidence,
as we collected practitioners’ opinions on V&V of
ML-based systems in safety-critical domains (cf. D
in Fig. 2). Thus, the lower part focused on maximiz-
ing academic rigor.
Fig. 2. Overview of the SMILE project from an evidence
perspective. We treat the evidence as four different sets: A.
Related work and C. Snowballed literature represent sec-
ondary evidence, whereas B. Workshop findings and D.
Survey responses constitute primary evidence.
3.1. The systematic review
Inspired by evidence-based medicine, systematic lit-
erature reviews have become a popular software en-
gineering research method to aggregate work in a
research area. Snowballing literature reviews103 is
an alternative to more traditional database searches
relying on carefully developed search strings, par-
ticularly suitable when the terminology used in the
area is diverse, e.g., in early stages of new research
topics. This section describes the two main phases
of the literature review: 1) paper selection and 2)
data extraction and analysis.
3.1.1. Paper selection
As safety-critical applications of DNNs in the auto-
motive sector is still a new research topic, we de-
cided to broaden our literature review to encompass
also other types of ML, and also to go beyond the au-
tomotive sector. We developed the following crite-
ria: for a publication to be included in our literature
review, it should describe 1) engineering of an ML-
based system 2) in the context of autonomous cyber-
physical systems, and 3) the paper should address
V&V or safety analysis. Consequently, our crite-
ria includes ML beyond neural networks and DNNs.
Our focus on autonomous cyber-physical systems
implicitly restricts our scope to safety-critical sys-
tems. Finally, we exclude papers that do not target
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V&V or safety analysis, but instead other engineer-
ing considerations, e.g., requirements engineering,
software architecture, or implementation issues.
First, we established a start set using exploratory
searching in Google Scholar and applying our in-
clusion criteria. By combining various search terms
related to ML, safety analysis, and V&V identified
during the project definition phase of the workshop
series (cf. a) in Fig 1), we identified 14 papers rep-
resenting a diversity of authors, publishers, and pub-
lications venues, i.e., adhering to recommendations
for a feasible start set103. Still, the composition of
the start set is a major threat to the validity of any
snowballing literature review. Table 5 shows the pa-
pers in the start set.
Originating in the 14 papers in the start set, we
iteratively conducted backward and forward snow-
balling. Backward snowballing means scanning the
reference lists for additional papers to include. For-
ward snowballing from a paper involves adding re-
lated papers that cite the given paper. We refer to
one combined effort of backward and forward snow-
balling as an iteration. In each iteration, two re-
searchers collected candidates for inclusion and two
other researchers validated the selection using the
inclusion criteria. Despite our efforts to carefully
process iterations, there is always a risk that rel-
evant publications could not be identified by fol-
lowing references from our start set due to citation
patterns in the body of scientific literature, e.g., re-
search cliques.
3.1.2. Data extraction and analysis
When the snowballing was completed, two authors
extracted publication metadata according to a pre-
defined extraction form, e.g., publication venue and
application domain. Second, the same two authors
conducted an assessment of rigor and relevance as
recommended by Ivarsson and Gorschek45. Third,
they addressed RQ1 using thematic analysis26, i.e.,
summarizing, integrating, combining, and compar-
ing findings of primary studies to identify patterns.
Our initial plan was to classify challenges and
solution proposals in previous work using classifica-
tion schemes developed by Amodei et al. [P2] and
Varshney101, respectively. However, neither of the
two proposed categorization schemes were success-
ful in spanning the content of the selected papers.
To better characterize the selected body of research,
we inductively created new classification schemes
for challenges and solution proposals according to a
grounded theory approach. Table 1 defines the final
categories used in our study, seven challenge cate-
gories and five solution proposal categories.
3.2. The questionnaire-based survey
To validate the findings from the snowballed liter-
ature (cf. C. in Figure 2), we designed a web-
based questionnaire to survey practitioners in safety-
critical domains. Furthermore, reaching out to addi-
tional practitioners beyond the SMILE project en-
ables us to collect more insights into challenges
related to ML-based systems in additional safety-
critical contexts (cf. D. in Fig. 2). Moreover, we
used the survey to let the practitioners rate the im-
portance of the challenges reported in the academic
literature, as well as the perceived feasibility of the
published solutions proposals.
We designed the survey instrument using Google
Forms, structured as 10 questions organized into
two sections. The first section consisted of seven
closed-end questions related to demographics of the
respondents and their organizations and three Lik-
ert items concerning high-level statements on V&V
of ML-based systems. The second section consisted
of three questions: 1) rating the importance of the
challenge categories, 2) rating how promising the
solution proposal categories are, and 3) an open-end
free-text answer requesting a comment on our main
findings and possibly adding missing aspects.
We opted for an inclusive approach and used
convenience sampling to collect responses76, i.e., a
non-probabilistic sampling method. The target pop-
ulation was software and systems engineering prac-
titioners working in safety-critical contexts, includ-
ing both engineering and managerial roles, e.g., test
managers, developers, architects, safety engineers,
and product managers. The main recruitment strat-
egy was to invite the extended SMILE network (cf.
workshops #5 and #6 in Fig. 1) and to advertise the
survey invitation in LinkedIn groups related to de-
velopment of safety-critical systems. We collected
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Table 1: Definition of categories of challenges and solution proposals for V&V of ML-based systems.
Challenge Categories Definitions
State-space explosion Challenges related to the very large size of the input space.
Robustness Issues related to operation in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful envi-
ronmental conditions.
Systems engineering Challenges related to integration or co-engineering of ML-based and conven-
tional components.
Transparency Challenges originating in the black-box nature of the ML system.
Requirements specification Problems related to specifying expectations on the learning behavior.
Test specification Issues related to designing test cases for ML-based systems, e.g., non-
deterministic output.
Adversarial attacks Threats related to antagonistic attacks on ML-based systems, e.g., adversarial
examples.
Solution Proposal Categories Definitions
Formal methods Approaches to mathematically prove that some specification holds.
Control theory Verification of learning behavior based on automatic control and self-adaptive
systems.
Probabilistic methods Statistical approaches such as uncertainty calculation, Bayesian analysis, and
confidence intervals.
Test case design Approaches to create effective test cases, e.g., using genetic algorithms or pro-
cedural generation.
Process guidelines Guidelines supporting work processes, e.g., covering training data collection
or testing strategies.
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answers in 2017, from July 1 to August 31.
As a first step of the response analysis, we per-
formed a content sanity check to identify invalid an-
swers, e.g., nonsense or careless responses. Subse-
quently, we collected summary statistics of the re-
sponses and visualized it with bar charts to get a
quick overview of the data. We calculated Spear-
man rank correlation (ρ) between all ordinal scale
responses, interpreting correlations as weak, moder-
ate, and strong for ρ > 0.3, ρ > 0.5, and ρ > 0.7,
respectively. Finally, the two open-ended questions
were coded, summarized, and validated by four of
the co-authors.
4. Results and Discussion
This section is organized according to the evidence
perspective provided in Fig. 2: A. Related work, B.
Workshop findings, C. Snowballed literature, and D)
Survey responses. As reported in Section 3, A. and
B. focus on industrial relevance, whereas C. and D.
aim at academic rigor.
4.1. Related work
The related work section (cf. A. in Fig. 2) presents
an overview of literature that was identified during
the SMILE project. Fourteen of the papers were se-
lected early to seed the (independent) snowballing
literature review described in Section 3.1. In this
section, we first describe the start set [P1]-[P14],
and then papers that were subsequently identified by
SMILE members or the anonymous reviewers of the
manuscript – but not through the snowballing pro-
cess (as these are reported separately in Section 4.3).
4.1.1. The snowballing start set
The following 14 papers were selected as the snow-
balling start set, representing a diverse set of au-
thors, publication venues, and publication years. We
briefly describe them below, and motivate their in-
clusion in the start set.
[P1] Clark et al. reported from a US Air Force
research project on challenges in V&V of au-
tonomous systems. This work is highly related to
the SMILE project.
[P2] Amodei et al. listed five challenges to artificial
intelligence safety according to Google Brain: 1)
avoiding negative side effects, 2) avoiding reward
hacking, 3) scalable oversight, 4) safe exploration,
and 5) robustness to distributional shift.
[P3] Brat and Jonsson discussed challenges in V&V
of autonomous systems engineered for space ex-
ploration. Included to cover the space domain.
[P4] Broggi et al. presented extensive testing of the
BRAiVE autonomous vehicle prototype by driv-
ing from Italy to China. Included as it is different,
i.e., reporting experiences from a practical trip.
[P5] Taylor et al. sampled research in progress
(in 2003) on V&V of neural networks, aimed
at NASA applications. Included to snowball re-
search conducted in the beginning of the millen-
nium.
[P6] Taylor et al. with the Machine Intelligence Re-
search Institute surveyed design principles that
could ensure that systems behave in line with the
interests of their operators – which they refer to
as “AI alignment”. Included to bring in a more
philosophical perspective on safety.
[P7] Carvalho et al. presented a decade of research
on control design methods for systematic handling
of uncertain forecasts for autonomous vehicles.
Included to cover robotics.
[P8] Ramos et al. proposed a DNN-based obstacle
detection framework, providing sensor fusion for
detection of small road hazards. Included as the
work closely resembles the use case discussed at
the workshops (see Section 4.2).
[P9] Alexander et al. suggested “situation coverage
methods” for autonomous robots to support test-
ing of all environmental circumstances. Included
to cover coverage.
[P10] Zou et al. discussed safety assessments of
probabilistic airborne collision avoidance systems
and proposes a genetic algorithm to search for un-
desired situations. Included to cover probabilistic
approaches.
[P11] Zou et al. presented a safety validation ap-
proach for avoidance systems in unmanned aerial
vehicles, using evolutionary search to guide simu-
lations to potential conflict situations in large state
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spaces. Although the authors overlap, included to
snowball research on simulation.
[P12] Arnold and Alexander proposed using proce-
dural content generation to create challenging en-
vironmental situations when testing autonomous
robot control algorithms in simulations. Included
to cover synthetic test data.
[P13] Sivaraman and Trivedi compared three active
learning approaches for on-road vehicle detection.
Included to add a semi-supervised ML approach.
[P14] Mozaffari et al. developed a robust safety-
oriented autonomous cruise controller based on
the model predictive control technique. Included
to identify approaches based on control theory.
In the start set, we consider [P1] to be the
research endeavor closest to our current study.
While we target the automotive domain rather than
aerospace, both studies address highly similar re-
search objectives – and also the method used to
explore the topic is close to our approach. [P1]
describes a year-long study aimed at: 1) under-
standing the unique challenges to the certification
of safety-critical autonomous systems and 2) iden-
tifying the V&V approaches needed to overcome
them. To accomplish this, the US Air Force or-
ganized three workshops with representatives from
industry, academia, and governmental agencies, re-
spectively. [P1] concludes that that there are four
enduring problems that must be addressed:
• State-Space Explosion – In an autonomous sys-
tem, the decision space is non-deterministic and
the system might be continuously learning. Thus,
over time, there may be several output signals for
each input signal. This in turn makes it inherently
challenging to exhaustively search, examine, and
test the entire decision space.
• Unpredictable Environments – Conventional sys-
tems have limited ability to adapt to unantici-
pated events, but an autonomous systems should
respond to situations that were not programmed at
design time. However, there is a trade-off between
performance and correct behavior, which exacer-
bates the state-space explosion problem.
• Emergent Behavior – Non-deterministic and
adaptive systems may induce behavior that result
in unintended consequences. Challenges com-
prise how to understand all intended and unin-
tended behavior and how to design experiments
and test vectors that are applicable to adaptive de-
cision making in an unpredictable environment.
• Human-Machine Communication – Hand-off,
communication, and cooperation between the op-
erator and the autonomous system play an impor-
tant role to create mutual trust between the human
and the system. It is not known how to address
these issues when the behavior is not known at
design time.
With these enduring challenges in mind, [P1]
calls for research to pursue five goals in future tech-
nology development. First, approaches to cumula-
tively build safety evidence through the phases of
Research & Development (R&D), Test & Evaluation
(T&E), and Operational Tests. The US Air Force
calls for effective methods to reuse safety evidence
throughout the entire product development lifecycle.
Second, [P1] argues that formal methods, embedded
during R&D, could provide safety assurance. This
approach could reduce the need for T&E and oper-
ational tests. Third, novel techniques to specify re-
quirements based on formalism, mathematics, and
rigorous natural language could bring clarity and
allow automatic test case generation and automated
traceability to low-level designs. Fourth, run-time
decision assurance may allow restraining the behav-
ior of the system, thus shifting focus from off-line
verification to instead performing on-line testing at
run-time. Fifth, [P1] calls for research on compo-
sitional case generation, i.e., better approaches to
combine different pieces of evidence into one com-
pelling safety case.
4.1.2. Non-snowballed related work
This subsection reports the related work that stirred
up the most interesting discussions in the SMILE
project. In contrast to the snowballing literature re-
view, we do not provide steps to replicate the identi-
fication of the following papers.
Knauss et al. conducted an exploratory inter-
view study to elicit challenges when engineering au-
tonomous cars51. Based on interviews and focus
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groups with 26 domain experts in five countries, the
authors report in particular challenges in testing au-
tomated vehicles. Major challenges are related to:
1) virtual testing and simulation, 2) safety, reliabil-
ity, and quality, 3) sensors and their models 4) com-
plexity of, and amount of, test cases, and 5) hand-off
between driver and vehicle.
Spanfelner et al. conducted research on safety
and autonomy in the ISO 26262 context93. Their
conclusion is that driver assistance systems need
models to be able to interpret the surrounding envi-
ronment, i.e., to enable vehicular perception. Since
models, by definition, are simplifications of the real
world, they will be subject to functional insufficien-
cies. By accepting that such insufficiencies may fail
to reach the functional safety goals, it is possible to
design additional measures that in turn can meet the
safety goals.
Heckemann et al. identified two primary chal-
lenges in developing autonomous vehicles adhering
to ISO 2626237. First, the driver is today considered
to be part of the safety concept, but future vehicles
will make driving maneuvers without interventions
by a human driver. Second, the system complexity
of modern vehicle systems is continuously growing
as new functionality is added. This obstructs safety
assessment, as increased complexity makes it harder
to verify freedom of faults.
Varshney discussed concepts related to engineer-
ing safety for ML systems from the perspective of
minimizing risk and epistemic uncertainty101, i.e.,
uncertainty due to gaps in knowledge as opposed to
intrinsic variability in the products. More specif-
ically, he analyzed how four general strategies for
promoting safety64 apply to systems with ML com-
ponents. First, inherently safe design means exclud-
ing a potential hazard from the system instead of
controlling it. A prerequisite for assuring such a
design is to improve the interpretability of the typ-
ically opaque ML models. Second, safety reserves
means the factor of safety, e.g., the ratio of absolute
structural capacity to actual applied load in struc-
tural engineering. In ML, interpretations include a
focus on a the maximum error of classifiers instead
of the average error, or training models to be robust
to adversarial examples. Third, safe fail implies that
a system remains safe even when it fails in its in-
tended operation, traditionally by relying on con-
structs such as electrical fuses and safety valves. In
ML, a concept of run-time monitoring must be ac-
complished, e.g., by continuously monitoring how
certain a DNN model is performing in its classifica-
tion task. Fourth, procedural safeguards covers any
safety measures that are not designed into the sys-
tem, e.g., mandatory safety audits, training of per-
sonnel, and user manuals describing how to define
the training set.
Seshia et al. identified five major challenges
to achieve formally-verified AI-based systems 86.
First, a methodology to provide a model of the en-
vironment even in the presence of uncertainty. Sec-
ond, a precise mathematical formulation of what the
system is supposed to do, i.e., a formal specification.
Third, the need to come up with new techniques to
formally model the different components that will
use machine learning. Fourth, systematically gener-
ating training and testing data for ML-based compo-
nents. Finally, developing computationally scalable
engines that are able to verify quantitatively the re-
quirements of a system.
One approach to tackle the opaqueness of DNNs
is to use visualization. Bojarski et al.13 developed a
tool for visualizing the parts of an image that are
used for decision making in vehicular perception.
Their tool demonstrated an end-to-end driving ap-
plication where the input is images and the output
is the steering angle. Mhamdi et al. also studied
the black box aspects of neural networks, and show
that the robustness of a complete DNN can be as-
sessed by an analysis focused on individual neurons
as units of failure62 – a much more reasonable ap-
proach given the state-space explosion.
In a paper on ensemble learning, Varshney et al.
describes a reject option for classifiers102. Such a
classifier could, instead of presenting a highly un-
certain classification, request that a human operator
must intervene. A common assumption is that the
classifier is the least confident in the vicinity of the
decision boundary, i.e., that there is an inverse re-
lationship between distance and confidence. While
this might be true in some parts of the feature space,
it is not a reliable measure in parts that contain too
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few training examples. For a reject option to provide
a “safe fail” strategy, it must trigger both 1) near the
decision boundary in parts of the feature space with
many training examples, and 2) in any decision rep-
resented by too few training examples.
Heckemann et al. proposed using the concept of
adaptive safety cage architectures to support future
autonomy in the automotive domain37, i.e., an inde-
pendent safety mechanism that continuously moni-
tors sensor input. The authors separated two areas
of operation: a valid area (that is considered safe)
and an invalid area that can lead to hazardous situ-
ations. If the function is about to enter the invalid
area, the safety cage will invoke an appropriate safe
action, such as a minimum risk emergency stopping
maneuver or a graceful degradation. Heckemann
et al. argued that a safety cage can be used in an
ASIL decomposition by acting as a functionally re-
dundant system to the actual control system. The
highly complex control function could then be de-
veloped according to the quality management stan-
dard, whereas the comparably simple safety cage
could adhere to a higher ASIL level.
Adler et al. presented a similar run-time mon-
itoring mechanism for detecting malfunctions, re-
ferred to as a safety supervisor1. Their safety su-
pervisor is part of an overall safety approach for au-
tonomous vehicles, consisting of a structured four-
step method to identify the most critical combina-
tions of behaviors and situations. Once the criti-
cal combinations have been specified, the authors
propose implementing tailored safety supervisors to
safeguard against related malfunctions.
Finally, a technical report prepared by Bhat-
tacharyya et al. for the NASA Langley Re-
search Center discussed certification considerations
of adaptive systems in the aerospace domain10. The
report separates adaptive control algorithms and Ar-
tificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms, and the latter is
closely related to our study since it covers machine
learning and ANN. Their certification challenges for
adaptive systems are organized in four categories:
• Comprehensive requirements – Specifying a set
of requirements that completely describe the be-
havior, as mandated by current safety standards, is
presented as the most difficult challenge to tackle.
• Verifiable requirements – Specifying pass criteria
for test cases at design-time might be hard. Also,
current aerospace V&V relies heavily on coverage
testing of source code in imperative languages, but
how to interpret that for AI algorithms is unclear.
• Documented design – Certification requires de-
tailed documentation, but components realizing
adaptive algorithms were rarely developed with
this in mind. Especially AI algorithms are often
distributively developed by open source commu-
nities, which makes it hard to reverse engineer
documentation and traceability.
• Transparent design – Regulators expect a trans-
parent design and a conventional implementation
to be presented for evaluation. Increasing sys-
tem complexity by introducing novel adaptive al-
gorithms challenges comprehensibility and trust.
On top of that, adaptive systems are often non-
deterministic, which makes it harder to demon-
strate absence of unintended functionality.
4.2. The Workshop Series
During the six workshops with industry partners (cf.
#1-#6 in Fig. 1), we discussed key questions that
must be explored to enable engineering of safety-
critical automotive systems with DNNs. Three sub-
areas emerged during the workshops: 1) robustness,
2) interplay between DNN components and conven-
tional software, and 3) V&V of DNN components.
4.2.1. Robustness of DNN Components
The concept of robustness permeated most discus-
sions during the workshops. While robustness is
technically well-defined, in the workshops it often
remained a rather elusive quality attribute – typically
translated to “something you can trust”.
To bring the workshop participants to the same
page, we found it useful to base the discussions on
a simple ML case: a confusion matrix for a one-
class classifier for camera-based animal detection.
For each input image, the result of the classifier is
limited to one of the four options: 1) an animal is
present and correctly classified (true positive), 2) no
animal is present and the classifier does not signal
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animal detection (true negative), 3) the classifier re-
ports animal presence, but there is none (false pos-
itive), and 4) an animal is present, but the classifier
misses it (false negative).
For the classifier to be considered robust, the
participants stressed the importance of not gener-
ating false positives and false negatives despite oc-
casional low quality input or changes in the envi-
ronmental conditions, e.g., dusk, rain, or sun glare.
A robust ML system should neither miss present
animals, risking collisions, nor suggest emergency
braking that risk rear-end collisions. As the impor-
tance of robustness in the example is obvious, we
see a need for future research both on how to spec-
ify and verify acceptable levels of ML robustness.
During the workshops, we also discussed
more technical aspects engineering robust DNN
components. First, our industry practitioners
brought up the issue of DNN architectures to
be problem-specific. While there are some ap-
proaches to automatically generating neural network
architectures6,104, typically designing the DNN ar-
chitecture is an ad hoc process of trial and error.
Often a well known architecture is used as a base-
line and then it is tuned to fit the problem at hand.
Our workshops recognized the challenge of engi-
neering robust DNN-based systems, in part due to
their highly problem-specific architectures.
Second, once the DNN architecture is set, train-
ing commences to assign weights to the trainable
parameters of the network. The selection of train-
ing data must be representative for the task, in our
discussions animal detection, and for the environ-
ment that the system will operate in. The work-
shops agreed that robustness of DNN components
can never be achieved without careful selection of
training data. Not only must the amount and quality
of sensors (in our case cameras) acquiring the dif-
ferent stimuli for the training data be sufficient, also
other factors such as positioning, orientation, aper-
ture, and even geographical location like city and
country must match the animal detection example.
At the workshops, we emphasized the issue of cam-
era positions as both car and truck manufacturers
were part of SMILE – to what extent can training
data from a car’s perspective be reused for a truck?
Or should a truck rather benefit from its size and col-
lect dedicated training data from its elevated camera
position?
Third, also related to training data, the work-
shops discussed working with synthetic data. While
such data always can be used to complement train-
ing data, there are several open questions on how to
best come up with the best mix during the training
stage. As reported in Section 2.2, GANs30,74 could
be a good tool for synthesizing data. Sixt et al.90
proposed a framework called RenderGAN that could
generate large amounts of realistic labeled data for
training. In transfer learning, training efficiency im-
proves by combining data from different data sets
29,69. One possible approach could be to first train
the DNN component using synthetic data from, e.g.,
simulators like TORCS§, then data from some pub-
licly available database could be used to continue
the training, e.g., the KITTI data¶or CityScape‖, and
finally, data from the geographical region where the
vehicle should operate could be added. For any at-
tempts at transfer learning, the workshops identi-
fied the need to measure to what extent training data
matches the planned operational environment.
4.2.2. Complementing DNNs with Conventional
Components
During the workshops, we repeatedly reminded the
participants to consider DNNs from a systems per-
spective. DNN components will always be part of an
automotive system consisting of also conventional
hardware and software components.
Several researchers claim that that DNN compo-
nents is a prerequisite for autonomous driving28,2,79.
However, how to integrate such components in a
system is an open question. Safety is a systems
issue, rather than a component specific issue. All
hazards introduced by both DNNs and conventional
software must be analyzed within the context of sys-
§ http://torcs.sourceforge.net
¶ http://www.cvlibs.net/datasets/kitti/
‖ https://www.cityscapes-dataset.com/
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tems engineering principles. On the other hand, the
hazards can also be addressed on a system level.
One approach to achieve DNN safety is to intro-
duce complementary components, i.e., when a DNN
model fails to generalize, a conventional software
or hardware component might step in to maintain
safe operation. During the workshops, particular at-
tention was given to introducing a safety cage con-
cept. Our discussions orbited a solution in which
the DNN component was encapsulated by a super-
visor, or a safety cage, that continuously monitors
the input to the DNN component. The envisioned
safety cage should perform novelty detection 70 and
alert when input does not belong within the train-
ing region of the DNN component, i.e., if the risk of
failed generalization was too high, the safety cage
should re-direct the execution to a safe-track. The
safe-track should then operate without any ML com-
ponents involved, enabling traditional approaches to
safety-critical software engineering.
The concept of an ML safety cage is in line
with Varshney’s discussions of “safe fail”101. Dif-
ferent options to implement an ML safety cage in-
clude adaptations of fail-silent systems17, plausibil-
ity checks 52, and arbitration. However, Adler et al.1
indicated that the no free lunch theorem might ap-
ply for safety cages, by stating that if tailored safety
safety cages are to be developed to safeguard against
domain-specific malfunctions, thus, different safety
cages may be required for different systems.
Introducing redundancy in the ML system is an
approach related to the safe track. One method
is to use ensemble methods in computer vision
applications61, i.e., employing multiple learning al-
gorithms to improve predictive performance. Re-
dundancy can also be introduced in an ML-based
system using hardware component, e.g., using an ar-
ray of sensors of the same, or different, kind. In-
creasing the amount of input data should increase
the probability of finding patterns closer to the train-
ing data set. Combining data from various input
sources, referred to as sensor fusion, also helps over-
coming the potential deficiencies of individual sen-
sors.
4.2.3. V&V Approaches for Systems with DNN
Components
Developing approaches to engineer robust systems
with DNN components is not enough, the automo-
tive industry must also develop novel approaches to
V&V. V&V is a cornerstone in safety certification,
but it still remains unclear how to develop a safety
case around applications with DNNs.
As pointed out in previous work, the current
ISO 26262 standard is not applicable when develop-
ing autonomous systems that rely on DNNs37. Our
workshops corroborate this view, by identifying sev-
eral open questions that need to be better under-
stood:
• How is a DNN component classified in
ISO 26262? Should it be regarded as an indi-
vidual software unit or a component?
• From a safety perspective, is it possible to treat
DNN misclassifications as “hardware failures”? If
yes, are the hardware failure target values defined
in ISO 26262 applicable?
• ISO 26262 mandates complete test coverage of
the software, but what does this imply for a DNN?
What is sufficient coverage for a DNN?
• What metrics should be used to specify the DNN
accuracy? Should quality targets using such met-
rics be used in the DNN requirements specifica-
tions, and subsequently as targets for verification
activities?
Apart from the open questions, our workshop
participants identified several aspects that would
support V&V. First, as requirements engineering is
fundamental to high-quality V&V12, some work-
shop participants requested a formal, or semi-
formal, notation for requirements related to func-
tional safety in the DNN context. Defining low-
level requirements that would be verifiable appears
to be one of the greatest challenges in this area.
Second, there is a need for a tool-chain and frame-
work tailored to lifecycle management of systems
with DNN components – current solutions tailored
for human-readable source code are not feasible and
must be complemented with too many immature in-
ternal tools. Third, methods for test case generation
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for DNN will be critical, as manual creation of test
data does not scale.
Finally, a major theme during the workshops was
how to best use simulation as a means to support
V&V. We believe that the future will require mas-
sive use of simulation to ensure safe DNN com-
ponents. Consequently, there is a need to develop
simulation strategies to cover both normal circum-
stances as well as rare, but dangerous, traffic situa-
tions. Furthermore, simulation might also be used to
assess the sensitivity to adversarial examples.
4.3. The systematic snowballing
Table 5 shows the results from the five iterations
of the snowballing. In total, the snowballing pro-
cedure identified 64 papers including the start set.
We notice two publication peaks: 29 papers were
published between 2002-2007 and 25 papers were
published between 2013-2016. The former set of
papers were dominated by research on using neu-
ral networks for adaptive flight controllers, whereas
the latter set predominantly addresses the automo-
tive domain. This finding suggests that organiza-
tions currently developing ML-based systems for
self-driving cars could learn from similar endeav-
ors in the aerospace domain roughly a decade ago
– while DNN was not available then, several aspects
of V&V enforced by aerospace safety standards are
similar to ISO 26262. Note, however, that 19 of the
papers do not target any specific domain, but rather
discusses ML-based systems in general.
Table 2 shows the distribution of challenge and
solution proposal categories identified in the papers;
‘#’ indicates the number of unique challenges or so-
lution proposals matching a specific category. As
each paper can report more than one challenge or
solution proposal, and the same challenge or solu-
tion proposal can occur in more than one paper, the
number of Paper IDs in the third column does not
necessarily match the ‘#’. The challenges most fre-
quently mentioned in the papers relate to state-space
explosion and robustness, whereas the most com-
monly proposed solutions constitute approaches that
belong to formal methods, control theory, or proba-
bilistic methods.
Regarding the publication years, we notice that
the discussion on state-space explosion primarily
has been active in recent years, possibly explained
by the increasing application of DNNs. Looking at
solution proposals, we see that probabilistic meth-
ods was particularly popular during the first publica-
tion peak, and that research specifically addressing
test case design for ML-based systems has appeared
first after 2012.
Fig. 3 shows a mapping between solution pro-
posals categories and challenge categories. Some of
the papers propose a solution to address challenges
belonging to a specific category. For each such in-
stance, we connect solution proposals (to the left)
and challenges (to the right), i.e., the width of the
connection illustrates the number of instances. Note
that we did put the solution proposal in [P4] (deploy-
ment in real operational setting) in its own ‘Other’
category. None of the proposed solutions address
challenges related to the categories “Requirements
specification” or “Systems engineering”, indicating
a research gap. Furthermore, “Transparency” is the
challenge category that has been addressed the most
in the papers, followed by “State-space explosion”.
Fig. 3. Mapping between categories of solution proposals
(to the left) and challenges (to the right).
Two books summarize most findings from the
aerospace domain identified through our systematic
snowballing. Taylor edited a book in 2006 that col-
lected experiences for V&V of ANN technology96
in a project sponsored by the NASA Goddard Space
Flight Center. Taylor concluded that the V&V tech-
niques available at the time must evolve to tackle
∗∗The best practices were also later distilled into a guidance document intended for practitioners73
M. Borg et al. / Safely Entering the Deep
Table 2. Distribution of challenge and solution proposal cate-
gories.
Challenge category # Paper IDs
State-space explosion 6 [P3], [P15], [P16], [P47]
Robustness 4 [P1], [P2], [P15], [P55]
Systems engineering 2 [P1], [P55]
Transparency 2 [P1], P55]
Requirements specification 3 [P15], [P55]
Test specification 3 [P16], [P46], [P55]
Adversarial attacks 1 [P15]
Solution proposal category # Paper IDs
Formal methods 8
[P3], [P26], [P42], [P28],
[P37], P[40], [P44], [P53]
Control theory 7
[P7], [P20], [P25], [P64],
[P36], [P47], [P57], [P60]
Probabilistic methods 7
[P18], [P30], [P31], [P32], [P33],
[P35], [P50], [P52], [P54]
Test case design 5 [P9], [P10], [P12], [P17], [P21]
Process guidelines 4 [P23], [P51], [P56], [P59]
ANNs. Taylor’s book reports five areas that need
to be augmented to allow V&V of ANN-based sys-
tems:∗∗
• Configuration management must track all addi-
tional design elements, e.g., the training data, the
network architecture, and the learning algorithms.
Any V&V activity must carefully specify the con-
figuration under test.
• Requirements need to specify novel adaptive be-
havior, including control requirements (how to ac-
quire and act on knowledge) and knowledge re-
quirements (what knowledge should be acquired).
• Design specifications must capture design choices
related to novel design elements such as training
data, network architecture, and activation func-
tions. V&V of the ANN design should ensure that
the choices are appropriate.
• Development lifecycles for ANNs are highly itera-
tive and last until some quantitative goal has been
reached. Traditional waterfall software develop-
ment is not feasible, and V&V must be an integral
part rather than an add-on.
• Testing needs to evolve to address novel re-
quirements. Structure testing should determine
whether the network architecture is better at learn-
ing according to the control requirements than al-
ternative architectures. Knowledge testing should
verify that the ANN has learned what was speci-
fied in the knowledge requirements.
The second book that has collected experiences
on V&V of (mostly aerospace) ANNs, also funded
by NASA, was edited by Schumann and Liu and
published in 201083. While the book primarily sur-
veys the use of ANNs in high-assurance systems,
parts of the discussion is focused on V&V – and the
overall conclusion that V&V must evolve to handle
ANNs is corroborated. In contrast to the organiza-
tion we report in Table 2, the book suggests grouping
solution proposals into approaches that: 1) separate
ANN algorithms from conventional source code, 2)
analyze the network architecture, 3) consider ANNs
as function approximators, 4) tackle the opaqueness
of ANNs, 5) assess the characteristics of the learn-
ing algorithm, 6) analyze the selection and quality of
training data, and 7) provides means for online mon-
itoring of ANNs. We believe that our organization is
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largely orthogonal to the list above, thus both could
be used in a complementary fashion.
4.4. The survey
This section organizes the findings from the survey
into closed questions, correlation analysis, and open
questions, respectively.
4.4.1. Closed questions
Forty-nine practitioners answered our survey, most
of them primarily working in Europe (38 out of 49,
77.6%). Twenty respondents (40.8%) work primar-
ily in the automotive domain, followed by 14 in
aerospace (28.6%). Other represented domains in-
clude process industry (5 respondents), railway (5
respondents), and government/military (3 respon-
dents). The respondents represent a variety of roles,
from system architects (17 out of 49, 34.7%) to
product developers (10 out of 49, 20.4%), and man-
agerial roles (7 out of 49, 14.3%). Most respondents
primarily work in Europe (38 out of 49, 77.6%) or
North America (7 out of 49, 14.3%).
Most respondents have some proficiency in ML.
Twenty-five respondents (51.0%) report having fun-
damental awareness of ML concepts and practical
ML concerns. Sixteen respondents (32.7%) have
higher proficiency, i.e., can implement ML solutions
independently or with guidance – but no respondents
consider themselves ML experts. On the other side
of the spectrum, eight respondents report possessing
no ML knowledge.
We used three Likert items to assess the respon-
dents’ general thoughts about ML and functional
safety, reported as a)-c) in Table 3. Most respon-
dents agree (or strongly agree) that applying ML in
safety-critical applications will be important in their
organizations in the future (29 out of 49, 59.2%),
whereas eight (16.3%) disagree. At the same time,
29 out of 49 (59.2%) of the respondents report that
V&V of ML-based features is considered particu-
larly difficult by their organizations – 20 respondents
even strongly agrees with the statement. It is clear
to our respondents that more attention is needed re-
garding V&V of ML-based systems, as only 10 out
of 49 (20.4%) believe that their organizations are
well-prepared for the emerging paradigm.
Robustness (cf. e) in Table 3) stands out as the
particularly important challenge, reported as “ex-
tremely important” by 29 out of 49 (59.2%). How-
ever, all challenges covered in the questionnaire
were considered important by the respondents. The
only challenge that appears less urgent to the respon-
dents is adversarial attacks, but the difference is mi-
nor.
The respondents consider simulated test cases as
the most promising solution proposal to tackle chal-
lenges in V&V of ML-based systems, reported as
extremely promising by 18 out of 49 respondents
(36.7%) and moderately promising by 12 respon-
dents (24.5%). Probabilistic methods is the least
promising solution proposal according to the re-
spondents, followed by process guidelines.
4.4.2. Correlation analysis
We identified some noteworthy correlations in the
responses. The respondents’ ML proficiency (Q4)
is moderately correlated (ρ = 0.53) with the per-
ception of ML importance (Q5) – an expected find-
ing as respondents with a personal investment are
likely to be biased. More interestingly, we found that
ML proficiency was also moderately correlated to
two of the seven challenge categories: transparency
(ρ = 0.61) and state-space explosion (ρ = 0.54).
This suggests that these two challenges are partic-
ularly difficult to comprehend for non-experts. Per-
ceiving the organization as well-prepared for intro-
ducing ML-based solutions (Q4) is moderately cor-
related (ρ = 0.57) with considering systems engi-
neering challenges (Q7) as particularly important
and weakly correlated regarding process guidelines
(Q16) as a promising solution (ρ = 0.37). As these
are the only correlations with Q4, it indicates that or-
ganizations that have reached a certain ML maturity
have progressed beyond specific issues and instead
focus on the bigger picture, i.e, how to incorporate
ML in systems and how to adapt internal processes
in the new ML era.
There are more correlations within the cate-
gories of challenges (Q5-Q11) and solution propos-
als (Q12-Q16) than between the two groups. The
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Table 3. Answers to the closed questions of the survey. a)-c)
show three Likert items, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to
strongly agree (5). d)- o) reports on importance/promisingness
using the following ordinal scale: not at all, slightly, somewhat,
moderately, and extremely. The ‘Missing‘” column includes
both “I don’t know” answers and missing answers.
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only strong correlation between groups is test spec-
ification (Q11) and formal methods (Q12) (ρ =
0.71). Within the challenges, the correlation be-
tween the two challenges state-space explosion (Q5)
and transparency (Q8) stands out as particularly
strong (ρ = 0.91), illustrating the close connec-
tion between these two issues with large DNN ar-
chitectures. Also the two challenge categories re-
quirements specifications (Q9) and test specifica-
tions (Q11) are strongly correlated (ρ = 0.71), in
line with a large body of previous work on aligning
the two concepts12.
4.4.3. Open questions
The end of the questionnaire contained an open-
ended question (Q17), requesting a comment on
Fig. 3 and the accompanying findings: “although
few individual V&V challenges related to machine
learning transparency are highlighted in the litera-
ture, it is the challenge most often addressed by the
previous publications’ solution proposals. We also
find that the second most addressed challenge in pre-
vious work is related to state-space explosion.”
Sixteen out of 49 respondents (32.7%) provided
a free text answer to Q17, representing highly con-
trasting viewpoints. Eight respondents reported that
the findings were not in line with their expecta-
tions, whether seven respondents agreed – one re-
spondent neither agreed nor disagreed. Examples
of more important challenges emphasized by the re-
spondents include both other listed challenges, i.e.,
robustness and requirements specification, and other
challenges, e.g., uncertainty of sensor data (in au-
tomotive) and the knowledge gap between indus-
try and regulatory bodies (in the process industry).
Three respondents answer in general terms that the
main challenge of ML-based systems is the intrinsic
non-determinism.
On the other hand, the agreeing respondents mo-
tivate that state-space explosion is indeed the most
pressing challenge due to the huge input space of
the operational environment (both in automotive and
railway applications). One automotive researcher
stresses that the state-space explosion impedes rigid
testing but raises the transparency challenge as well
– a lack thereof greatly limits analyzability, which is
a key requirement for safety-critical systems. One
automotive developer argues that the bigger state-
space of the input domain, the bigger the attack sur-
face becomes – possibly referring to both adversar-
ial attacks and other antagonistic cyber attacks. Fi-
nally, two respondents provide answers that encour-
age us to continue work along to paths in the SMILE
project: 1) a tester in the railway domain explains
that the traceability during root cause analyses in
ML-applications will be critical, in line with our
argumentation at a recent traceability conference15,
and 2) one automotive architect argues that the
state-space explosion will not be the main challenge
as any autonomous driving will have to be within
“guard rails”, i.e., a solution similar to the safety
cage architectures we intend to develop in the next
phase of the project.
Seven respondents complemented the survey an-
swers with concluding thoughts in Q18. One expe-
rienced manager in the aerospace domain explained:
“What is now called ML was called neural nets (but
less sophisticated) 30 years ago.”, a statement that
supports our recommendation that the automotive
industry should aim for a cross-domain knowledge
transfer regarding V&V of ML-based systems. The
manager followed by stating: “it (ML) introduces
a new element in safety engineering. Or at least it
moves the emphasis to more resilience. If the classi-
fier is wrong, then it becomes a hazard and the sys-
tem must be prepared for it.” We agree with the re-
spondent that actions needed in the hazardous situa-
tion must be well-specified. Two respondents com-
ment that conservatism is fundamental in functional
safety, one of them elaborates that the “end of pre-
dictability” introduced by ML is a disruptive change
that requires a paradigm shift.
5. Revisiting the RQs
This section first discusses the RQs in a larger con-
text, and then aggregates the four sources of evi-
dence presented in Fig. 2. Finally, we discuss im-
plications for research and practice, including au-
tomotive manufacturers and regulatory bodies, and
conclude by reporting the main threats to validity.
Table 4 summarizes our findings.
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5.1. RQ1: State-of-the-art in V&V of
safety-critical ML
There is no doubt that deep learning research cur-
rently has incredible momentum. New applications
and success stories are reported every month – and
many applications come from the automotive do-
main. The rapid movement of the field is reflected
by the many papers our study has identified on
preprint archives, in particular the arXiv.org e-Print
archive. It is evident that researchers are eager to
claim novelty, and thus struggle to publish results as
fast as possible.
While DNNs have enabled amazing break-
throughs, there is much less published work on en-
gineering safety for DNNs. On the other hand, we
observe a growing interest as several researchers call
for more research on DNN safety, as well as ML
safety in general. However, there is no agreement
on how to best develop safety-critical DNNs, and
several different approaches have been proposed.
Contemporary research endeavors often address the
opaqueness of DNNs, to support analyzability and
interpretability of systems with DNN components.
Deep learning research is in its infancy, and the
tangible pioneering spirit sometimes brings the mind
to the Wild West. Anything goes, and there is a po-
tential for great academic recognition for ground-
breaking papers. There is certainly more fame in
showcasing impressive applications than updating
engineering practices and processes.
Safety engineering stands as a stark contrast to
the pioneering spirit. On the contrary, safety is per-
meated by conservatism. When a safety standard
is developed, it captures the best available prac-
tices to engineer safe systems. This approach in-
evitably results in standards that lag behind the re-
search front – safety first! In the automotive domain,
ISO 26262 was developed long before DNNs for ve-
hicles was an issue. Without question, DNNs consti-
tute a paradigm shift in how to approach functional
safety certification for automotive software, and we
do not believe in any quick fixes to patch ISO 26262
for this new era. As recognized by researchers be-
fore us, e.g., Salay et al.78, there is a considerable
gap between ML and ISO 26262 – a gap that proba-
bly needs to be bridged by new standards rather than
incremental updates of previous work.
Broadening the discussion from DNNs to ML in
general, our systematic snowballing of previous re-
search on safety-critical shows a peak of aerospace
research between 2002-2007 and automotive re-
search dominating from 2013 and onwards. We no-
tice that the aerospace domain allocated significant
resources to research on neural networks for adap-
tive flight controllers roughly a decade before DNNs
became popular in automotive research. We hypoth-
esize that considerable knowledge transfer between
the domains is possible now, and plan to proceed
such work in the near future.
The academic literature on challenges in ML-
based safety engineering has most frequently ad-
dressed state-space explosion and robustness (see
Table 1 for definitions). On the other hand, the
most commonly proposed solutions to overcome
challenges of ML-based safety engineering are ap-
proaches that belong to formal methods, control the-
ory, or probabilistic methods – but these appear to be
only moderately promising by industry practition-
ers, who would rather see research on simulated test
cases. As discussed in relation to RQ2, academia
and industry share a common view on what chal-
lenges are important, but the level of agreement on
what is the best way forward appears to be less clear.
5.2. RQ2: Main challenges for safe automotive
DNNs
Industry practice is far from certifying DNNs for
use in driverless safety-critical applications on pub-
lic roads. Both the workshop series and the sur-
vey show that industry practitioners across organiza-
tions do not know how to tackle the challenge of ap-
proaching regulatory bodies and certification agen-
cies with DNN-based systems. Most likely, both au-
tomotive manufacturers and safety standards need to
largely adapt to fit the new ML paradigm – the cur-
rent gap appears not to be bridgeable in the foresee-
able future through incremental science alone.
On the other hand, although the current safety
standards do not encompass ML yet, several auto-
motive manufacturers are highly active in engineer-
ing autonomous vehicles. Tesla has received signifi-
cant media coverage through pioneering demonstra-
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tions and self-confident statements. Volvo Cars is
also highly active through the Drive Me initiative,
and has announced a long-lasting partnership with
Uber toward autonomous taxis.
Several other partnerships have recently been
announced among automotive manufacturers, chip-
makers, and ML-intensive companies. For exam-
ple, Nvidia has partnered with Uber, Volkswagen,
and Audi to support engineering self-driving cars
using their GPU computing technology for ML de-
velopment. Nvidia has also partnered with the In-
ternet company Baidu, a company that has a highly
competitive ML research group. Similarly, the chip-
maker Intel has partnered with Fiat Chrysler Auto-
mobiles and the BMW Group to develop autonomy
around their Mobileye solution. Moreover, large
players such as Google, Apple, Ford, and Bosch are
active in the area, as well as startups such as nuTon-
omy and FiveAI – no one wants to miss the boat to
the lucrative future.
While there are impressive achievements both
from spearheading research, and some features are
already available on the consumer market, they all
have in common that the safety case argumentation
relies on a human-in-the-loop. In case there is a
critical situation, the human driver is expected to
be present and take control over the vehicle. There
are joint initiatives to formulate regulations for au-
tonomous vehicles, but, analogously, there is a need
for initiatives paving the way for new standards ad-
dressing functional safety of systems that rely on
ML and DNNs.
We elicited the most pressing issues concerning
engineering of DNN-based systems through a work-
shop series and a survey with practitioners. Many
discussions during the workshops were dominated
by robustness of DNN components, including de-
tailed considerations about robust DNN architec-
tures and the requirements on training data to learn
a robust DNN model. Also the survey shows the
importance of ML robustness, which motivates the
attention it has received in academic publications
(cf. RQ1). On the other hand, while there is an
agreement on the importance of ML robustness be-
tween academia and industry, how to tackle the phe-
nomenon is still an open question – and thus a po-
tential avenue for future research. Nonetheless, the
problem of training a robust DNN component cor-
responding to the complexity of public traffic con-
forms with several of the “enduring problems” high-
lighted by the US Air Force in their technical report
on V&V of autonomous systems [P1], e.g., state-
space explosion and unpredictable environments.
While robustness is stressed by practitioners,
academic publications have instead to a larger extent
highlighted challenges related to the limited trans-
parency of ML-based systems (e.g., Bhattacharyya
et al.10) and the inevitable state-space explosion.
The survey respondents confirm these challenges
as well, but we recommend future studies to meet
the expectations from industry regarding robustness
research. Note, however, that the concept of ro-
bustness might have different interpretations despite
having a formal IEEE definition42. Consequently,
we call for an empirical study to capture what in-
dustry means by ML and DNN robustness in the au-
tomotive context.
The workshop participants perceived two possi-
ble approaches to pave the way for safety-critical
DNNs as especially promising. First, continuous
monitoring of DNN input using a safety cage ar-
chitecture, a concept that has been proposed for
example by Adler et al.1. Monitoring safe oper-
ation, and re-directing execution to a “safe track”
without DNN involvement when uncertainties grow
too large, is an example of the safety strategy safe
fail101. Another approach to engineering ML safety,
considered promising by the workshops and the sur-
vey respondents alike, is to simulate test cases.
6. Conclusion and future work
Deep learning Neural Networks (DNN) is key to
enable the vehicular perception required for au-
tonomous driving. However, the behavior of DNN
components cannot be guaranteed by traditional
software and system engineering approaches. On
top of that, crucial parts of the automotive safety
standard ISO 26262 are not well-defined for certi-
fying autonomous systems78,39 – certain process re-
quirements contravene the nature of developing Ma-
chine Learning (ML)-based systems, especially in
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Table 4: Condensed findings in relation to the research questions, and implications for research and practice.
RQ1. What is the state-of-the-
art in V&V of ML-based safety-
critical systems?
• Most ML research showcases applications, while development on ML V&V is
lagging behind.
• Considerable gap between V&V mandated by safety standards and nature of
contemporary ML-based systems.
• The aerospace domain has collected experiences from V&V of adaptive flight
controllers based on neural networks.
• Support for V&V of ML-based systems can be organized into: 1) formal meth-
ods, 2) control theory, 3) probabilistic methods, 4) process guidelines, and 5)
simulated test cases.
• Academia has focused mostly on 1)–3), whereas industry perceives 5) as the
most promising.
RQ2. What are the main chal-
lenges when engineering safety-
critical systems with DNN com-
ponents in the automotive do-
main?
• How to certify safety-critical systems with DNNs for use on public roads is
unclear.
• Industry stresses robustness, whereas academia most often addresses state-
space explosion and the lack of ML transparency.
• Challenges elicited corroborate work on V&V by NASA and USAF, covering
neural networks, autonomous systems, and adaptive systems.
Implications for research and
practice • Gap between ML practice and ISO 26262 requires novel standards rather than
incremental updates.
• Cross-domain knowledge transfer from the aerospace V&V engineers to the
automotive domain appears promising.
• Need for empirical studies to clarify what robustness means in the context of
DNN-based autonomous vehicles.
• Systems-based safety approaches encouraged by industry, including safety cage
architectures and simulated test cases.
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relation to Verification and Validation (V&V).
Roughly a decade ago, using Artificial Neural
Networks (ANN) in flight controllers was an ac-
tive research topic, and also how to adhere to the
strict aerospace safety standards. Now, in the ad-
vent of autonomous driving, we recommend the au-
tomotive industry to learn from guidelines73 and
lessons learned96 from V&V of ANN-based com-
ponents developed to conform with the DO-178B
software safety standard for airborne systems. In
particular, automotive software developers need to
evolve practices for configuration management and
architecture specifications to encompass fundamen-
tal DNN design elements. Also, requirements spec-
ifications and the corresponding software testing
must be augmented to address the adaptive behav-
ior of DNNs. Finally, the highly iterative develop-
ment lifecycle of DNNs should be aligned with the
traditional automotive V-model for systems develop-
ment. A recent NASA report on safety certification
of adaptive aerospace systems10 confirms the chal-
lenges of requirements specification and software
testing. Moreover, related to ML, the report adds
the lack of documentation and traceability in many
open source libraries, and the issue of an exper-
tise gap between regulators and engineers – conven-
tional source code in C/C++ is very different from an
opaque ML model trained on a massive dataset.
The work most similar to ours also originated in
the aerospace domain, i.e., a project initiated by the
US Air Force to describe enduring problems (and fu-
ture possibilities) in relation to safety certification of
autonomous systems [P1]. The project highlighted
four primary challenges: 1) state-space explosion,
2) unpredictable environments, 3) emergent behav-
ior, and 4) human-machine communication. While
not explicitly discussing ML, the first two findings
match the most pressing needs elicited in our work,
i.e., state-space explosion as stressed by the aca-
demic literature (in combination with limited trans-
parency) and robustness as emphasized by the work-
shop participants as well as the survey respondents
(referred to as unpredictable environments in [P1]).
After having reviewed the state-of-the-art and
state-of-practice, the SMILE project will now em-
bark on a solution-oriented journey. Based on the
workshops, and motivated by the survey respon-
dents, we conclude that pursuing a solution based
on safety cage architectures37,1 encompassing DNN
components is a promising direction. Our rationale
is three-fold. First, the results from the workshops
with automotive experts from industry clearly mo-
tivates us, i.e., the participants strongly encouraged
us to explore such a solution as the next step. Sec-
ond, we believe it would be feasible to develop a
safety case around a safety cage architecture, since
the automotive industry already uses the concept in
the physical vehicles. Third, we believe the DNN
technology is ready to provide what is needed in
terms of novelty detection. The safety cage archi-
tecture we envision will continuously monitor in-
put data from the operational environment to re-
direct execution to a non-ML safe track when un-
certainties grow too large. Consequently, we ad-
vocate DNN safety strategies using a systems-based
approach rather than techniques that focus on the in-
ternals of DNNs. Finally, also motivated by both the
workshops and the survey respondents, we propose
an approach to V&V that makes heavy use of sim-
ulation – in line with previous recommendations by
other researchers 9,14,99.
Future work will also study how transfer learn-
ing could be used to incorporate training data from
different contexts or manufacturers, or even include
synthetic data from simulators, into DNNs for real-
world automotive perception. So far we have mostly
limited the discussion to fixed DNN-based systems,
i.e., systems trained only prior to deployment. An
obvious direction for future work is to to explore
how dynamic DNNs would influence our findings,
i.e., DNNs that adapt by continued learning either in
batches or through online learning. Furthermore, re-
search on V&V of ML-based systems is more com-
plex than pure technology in isolation. Thus, we
recognize the need to explore both ethical and le-
gal aspects involved in safety certification of ML-
based systems. Finally, there is a new automotive
standard under development that will address au-
tonomous safety: ISO/PAS 21448 Road vehicles –
Safety of the intended functionality. We are not
aware of its contents at the time of this writing, but
once published, we will use it as an important refer-
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ence point for our future solution proposals.
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